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Abstract 
This essay explores the challenge to the 
order/disorder binary offered by the dynamics 
of the psychoanalytic session, specifically 
one of Melanie Klein’s child analyses. It 
argues that the perception of psychoanalysis 
as normalizing is considerably complicated by 
the play of interpretation and resistance 
between analyst and child.  
 
Résumé 
Cet essai explore le concept binaire de 
normal/trouble offert par la dynamique de la 
session psychanalytique, plus particulièrement 
l’une des analyses sur l’enfant de Melanie 
Klein. Il argumente que la perception de 
normalisation de la psychanalyse s’avère 
considérablement compliquée par le jeu 
d’interprétation entre analyste et enfant. 
 
 
What is disorder? The prefix “dis-” 
indicates that disorder is the reversal of, or, 
more strongly, negation or absence of, order, 
when order is understood as the regular and 
harmonious functioning of things (OED). The 
order/disorder binary—like other binaries 
such as mind/body and reason/passion—has 
structured thinking, at least in the West, about 
disease and “madness,” seeing them as 
dangerous and anarchic, as the absence of 
health and sanity. Feminist critique has 
deconstructed such binaries foundational to 
Western medical and psychiatric discourses 
in order to expose their operation in 
reinforcing normative therapeutic practices 
and perpetuating the power relations—the 
systemic inequalities of gender, sexuality, 
race, and class—that characterize these 
practices. This article investigates the 
meaning of disorder—the vicissitudes of the 
order/disorder binary—in the context of 
psychoanalysis as a practice. The Freudian 
model of psychosexual development has 
been attacked, of course, from a gendered 
perspective as pathologizing non-masculine 
and non-hetero sexualities. As well, one line 
of critique regarding psychoanalysis as a 
therapeutic practice has seen it as 
normalizing: its interpretation of individual 
neurotic and hysterical symptoms as 
manifestations of disorder reduces the 
potential meanings of these “texts” to those 
sanctioned by the psychoanalytic institution 
and a society intolerant of mental difference, 
all in the interests of returning the patient to 
docile health or adaptation.  
While such a critique has been 
necessary in feminism’s work of analyzing 
patriarchal structures, I do think that it tends 
to overlook the complexity of psychoanalysis 
as a practice and the many directions it has 
taken in its evolution up to the present time. 
However, my purpose in this essay is not to 
defend psychoanalysis but rather to explore 
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what happens to the meaning of disorder, 
and indeed to the order/disorder binary itself, 
in the analytic situation. I will argue that the 
perception of psychoanalysis as a normal-
izing and disciplinary practice is considerably 
complicated by the emotional dynamics of an 
actual analysis, with its interplay of transfer-
ence and counter-transference—of interpret-
ation, resistance, and counter-resistance—
between analysand (patient) and analyst.  
It is true, of course, that analysis—
especially child analysis—is grounded in a 
structure of authority; it is an unequal 
relationship, ensuring that the analyst, as a 
well-trained professional, is presumed to be 
the one who knows what is “normal” and what 
is not. In this relationship, the analyst is the 
one who interprets the patient’s unconscious 
phantasies, who “reads” the symptoms for 
their latent meanings. And the analyst is the 
one who conveys this knowledge to the 
patient and helps her or him emerge from 
illness. Drawing upon Melanie Klein’s  
Narrative of a Child Analysis (1961), an 
account of Klein’s analysis in 1941 of 
Richard, a ten-year-old boy, I will suggest, 
however, that in the moment-by-moment 
unfolding of analysis as she practised it, the 
question of who knows and who doesn’t 
(want to) know, who interprets and who 
resists is not always easily answered. Klein’s 
Narrative is a very detailed and lengthy 
reconstruction of a child analysis based on 
the extensive notes she made after sessions; 
it allows one to follow a child’s analysis, with 
its interplay of resistance and interpretation 
on both sides, over the course of many 
sessions. By drawing on examples from the 
case, I will focus on how the child, Richard, 
responds to and often resists Mrs. K.’s 
graphic Oedipal interpretations of his play 
and drawings, how Mrs K. responds, and how 
Klein as author frames Richard’s resistance 
in her narrative of the analysis, reconstructing 
it years after the event and not long before 
her death. I will suggest that this narrative 
can be read for its moments of disavowal of 
the patient’s resistance, that is, its own points 
of counter-resistance. Richard, his analyst 
Mrs K., the author Melanie Klein—and to 
these I would add the reader of Narrative, 
responding emotionally to frequently shocking 
Oedipal interpretations—all take part in the 
analysis, an “uncanny encounter” (Kristeva 
2001, 144) that can never be controlled 
entirely. Jacqueline Rose argues that 
analysis “makes of the analyst a fool and a 
fantast” (1993, 169‒70); to explore what 
happens to the meaning of disorder, and 
indeed to the order/disorder binary itself in the 
relationship between analyst and analysand, I 
will argue that the perception of psychoanalysis 
as a normalizing and disciplinary practice is 
considerably complicated by the emotional 
dynamics of an actual analysis.  
Before turning to Klein’s Narrative, I will 
look briefly at some meanings of interpret-
ation, resistance, transference, and counter-
transference, and at the interplay of these 
processes in the analytic situation. Freud’s 
thinking about these concepts developed 
over his years of clinical experience, and as 
psychoanalytic practice in general has evolved 
and changed, as in Klein’s development of 
the play technique and child analysis, so have 
the meanings of these concepts. However, the 
understanding of interpretation as the process 
of apprehending and making explicit latent 
meanings, of “render[ing] the unconscious 
conscious,” has remained much the same 
(Segal 2008, 123). In his essays on psycho-
analytic technique, Freud addresses the 
transferential relation-ship that develops 
between analyst and patient. The aim of 
analysis is therapeutic insight: put simply, the 
analyst interprets the unconscious meanings 
of the patient’s associations or play and 
communicates these insights. Ideally, the 
patient becomes conscious of repressed 
phantasies and desires, and of the un-
conscious defences by which she or he has 
kept these repressed. Such knowledge 
emerges in the dynamic interplay, often conflict, 
of the patient’s and analyst’s perspectives. 
Central to this interplay is the patient’s 
transference to the analyst of unconscious 
love and hatred, which was originally ex-
perienced in relation to the earliest objects, 
the parents. For Freud, transferences are “new 
editions or facsimiles of the tendencies and 
phantasies which are aroused and made 
conscious during the progress of the analysis; 
but they have this peculiarity...that they re-
place some earlier person by the person of 
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the physician” (1905, 116). This process of 
making “facsimiles,” of making the present 
analyst a copy of a past person and 
transferring the phantasies associated with 
that person onto the analyst, is central to the 
therapeutic relationship in which change can 
occur. At the same time, however, inasmuch 
as it repeats the past, the transference is the 
patient’s means of resistance to insight, 
change, and movement into the future; thus, 
it is “the most powerful medium of resistance” 
to success (Freud 1912a, 101).  
Freud suggests that in seeking 
insight into the sources of the patient’s 
distress, “we [analysts] enter a region in 
which the resistance makes itself felt....It is at 
this point, on the evidence of our experience, 
that transference enters on the scene” 
(1912a, 103). Giving up one’s infantile 
phantasies is resisted, not surprisingly. As 
Freud puts it, “The resistance accompanies 
the treatment step by step....[E]very act of the 
person under treatment...represents a 
compromise between the forces that are 
striving towards recovery and the opposing 
ones” (1912a, 103). Resistance, understood 
as a force opposing recovery, is what makes 
analysis “interminable”; in Freud’s view near 
the end of his life, the resistance put up by 
the transference is evidence of “a 
force...which is absolutely resolved to hold on 
to illness and suffering” (1937, 242) and to 
keep the patient ignorant of happier 
alternatives. Freud’s earlier view was that 
“[t]he task of the treatment lies in combating 
these resistances” (1910, 7); analysis involves a 
war between the powers of order and 
disorder, knowledge and ignorance. Yet in 
1937 he was pessimistic, or at least a little 
more pragmatic, about the actual power of 
analysis to win this war and effect a cure, 
questioning whether “it [is] possible by means 
of analysis to attain to a level of absolute 
psychical normality” (1937, 219‒20). 
Analysts after Freud have shared his 
frustration with the wily ways by which 
patients resist insight. As British analyst Betty 
Joseph puts it, certain patients are in the grip 
of a “destructive anti-understanding” (1983, 
291): envious of the analyst’s knowledge, 
they are ready to “beat down and devalue 
what the analyst has...shown them” (1983, 
294).They may run resistance by asking her 
personal questions or by “distorting” her 
interpretations. They may “act and talk as if 
stupid” (1983, 295) or, on the other hand, 
offer their own interpretations, “convinced that 
they should be psychotherapists or analysts” 
themselves (297). Joseph sees such patients 
as “deeply encroaching,” although she does 
not consider here that in their “anti-under-
standing” or resistance, patients might them-
selves be defending against psychic encroach-
ment, resisting the trauma of “internaliz[ing] 
...the analyst’s interpretive function” (Bass 
2000, 251).  
While their clinical experience may lead 
analysts to feel that, as Adam Phillips puts it, 
“the only ambition that sustains people is the 
ambition to repeat the past” (Freud 2002, xxiv) 
and to resist understanding, analysts are 
people, too, and they are not exempt from being 
caught up in this process of unconscious 
repetition, that is, the counter-transference. As it 
has developed, psychoanalysis has increasingly 
recognized the counter-transference, which 
Paula Heimann defines as “the analyst’s 
emotional response to his patient within the 
analytic situation” (Heimann 1989, 74)—as 
illustrated in Joseph’s sense of some patients 
as “deeply encroaching.” Such a response, 
Heimann says, can be used as “an instrument 
of research into the patient’s unconscious” 
(1989, 74). No longer neutral, no longer what 
Freud called the “opaque” analyst, “a mirror 
...show[ing patients] nothing but what is 
shown to him” (Freud 1912b, 118), the 
analyst is a participant in the emotional 
dynamics of the analysis. While the counter-
transference should be controlled, not freely 
expressed, for the analyst it is “a most valuable 
means of checking whether he has under-
stood or failed to understand his patient” 
(Heimann 1989, 75). As the analyst’s 
emotional reaction to the patient, the counter-
transference complicates the picture of 
analysis as a cure carried out by a neutral 
interpreter who can penetrate to the un-
conscious meanings of a non-enlightened 
patient. Resistance accompanies knowledge 
for both participants in the analytic encounter. 
“Primary disavowal,” the inertia that clings to 
wish or illusion over reality, “is an always 
active force on both sides of the couch” (Bass 
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2000, 271); an awareness of this process is 
crucial if psychoanalysis is to know itself. 
Klein did not share Heimann’s view 
that the counter-transference is “one of the 
most important tools” in the analyst’s work 
(Heimann 1989, 74), although she does 
acknowledge in an unpublished source that in 
their often hostile and “non‒-co-operative” 
attitudes, in their disorderly conduct, schizo-
phrenic patients can arouse “counter-transfer-
ence feelings” in the analyst—a reaction, she 
adds drily, that is “inclined to be a negative 
one” (quoted in Hinshelwood 2008, 111‒12). 
On the whole, while her theories diverged 
from Freud’s, in her writings on clinical 
practice Klein is like Freud in that both tend to 
emphasize the authority and knowledge of 
the analyst as the one who interprets, not the 
one who is interpreted. For Klein, the analyst 
discerns the unconscious meanings of the 
child’s symbolic play and conveys these 
meanings to the child. “Deep” interpretations 
(ones that expose the most anxiety-provoking 
sadistic phantasies) are interventions aimed 
at reducing the child’s anxiety and freeing him 
or her from inhibitions in play and speech 
(Klein 1932). She worked on the assumption 
that, as long as they are addressed in simple, 
non-technical language, children can under-
stand Oedipal interpretations of their play as 
doing things with breasts and penises; for 
example, they can understand that bumping 
toy carriages together symbolizes parents 
“bump[ing] their ‘thingummies’...together” 
(1932, 17). They can understand these things 
because they are from birth sexual and 
aggressive beings: the vision of the asexual, 
innocent child, for Klein as for Freud, is a 
myth or fairy tale. Some analysts objected 
that such graphic sexual interpretations would 
sharply increase a child’s anxiety. However, 
Klein claims in The Psycho-Analysis of 
Children that such interpretations actually 
alleviate children’s anxiety, as demonstrated 
when, after an interpretation, they return to 
their play, their symbolic theatre of love and 
hate, life and death, with greater relish and 
creativity.  
In child analysis as in adult, the 
transference resists “the psycho-analytic 
procedure...as it begins to open up roads into 
the patient’s unconscious” (Klein 1997a, 48). 
In the playroom, the child patient is often 
more transparent than the adult; anxiety and 
resistance can be much more evident, as the 
younger child screams, breaks toys, wets 
herself, hides, or runs to mother in the waiting 
area. These are all forms of negative transfer-
ence, in Klein’s view—points at which the child 
sees the analyst as a fearful bad mother, 
points at which she must be quick to 
intervene with an interpretation. According to 
Juliet Mitchell, Klein’s clinical premise is that 
whatever is causing the anxiety “can be 
understood and put into words in an interpret-
ation which can bring clarity and relief” (Klein 
1986, 21). Timely interpretation can be 
effective “even when it does not appear to 
have been taken in consciously” (Klein 1932, 
8). The analyst, then, would appear to be the 
one who knows, who clarifies disorder and 
relieves intense anxiety. Yet Donald Meltzer 
claims that, in her actual practice, Klein 
interpreted “unashamedly in the dark” (Meltzer 
1998, 167), trying out ideas and discarding 
them. And in practice, the analyst’s authority 
may be challenged constantly, even by the 
smallest child. 
In her 1940 analysis of Richard, 
recounted twenty years later in Narrative of a 
Child Analysis, Klein was working with these 
assumptions about the analyst’s interpretive 
role and the inevitable interplay of interpret-
ation and resistance, assumptions she had 
held, more or less, since the beginning of her 
practice. However, just before this time, she 
published her major essay “Mourning and its 
Relation to Manic-Depressive States” (Klein 
1998). In the narrative, Mrs K. as well as 
Richard and his mother have moved away 
from London during the war, and the sessions 
take place in a rented playroom in their 
temporary location. Mrs K.’s analysis of 
Richard takes into account his mourning for 
his lost home and way of life, and interprets 
his defences against this painful emotional 
state. The analysis works on the assumption 
that, in Hanna Segal’s words, “symbol 
formation is the outcome of a loss” (Segal 
2008, 76). From the beginning of her practice 
with children, Klein ensured that each child 
had access to aids to symbol formation: “little 
toys” (small wooden male and female figures, 
animals, cars, trains), paper and pencils for 
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drawing, plus a sink and running water (Klein 
1932, 32‒33). But Richard, being ten, is not 
initially interested in these little toys Mrs. K. 
has to offer; rather, he is anxiously following 
the war, bringing a set of model battleships to 
the sessions and drawing U-boats and 
bombers. Mrs K. interprets his battleship play 
and his drawings as symbolizing Oedipal 
conflicts. She also interprets Richard’s talk 
and questions about the war, his frequent 
recourse to a map of Europe on the wall, the 
personal questions he put to her about her 
life and her past, and even his fidgety rituals 
such as turning the electric fire on and off and 
checking the clock. Everything the boy says 
and does is interpretable in Oedipal terms, 
especially his moments of anxiety and 
resistance to interpretation. While Mrs. K. 
acknowledges and refers to Richard’s fears of 
Hitler and German bombs, she sees his 
depression as arising not so much from the 
war as from the Oedipal anxieties that these 
conscious fears have “stirred up” (1961, 19). 
Or, as Lyndsey Stonebridge writes, for Klein 
the war will not stay in the external world: it 
“fails to remain objective and becomes 
entangled with early anxiety and guilt” (1998, 
199). To put it more bluntly, in every case, 
“the child’s worries signif[y] something else” 
(Hinshelwood 1994, 38), and Richard will 
overcome his fears only when his worries, 
questions, and dreams about the war and 
Hitler are interpreted in terms of the Oedipal 
war within. 
Narrative of a Child Analysis gives an 
excellent illustration of Klein’s analytic method, 
summarized by the sequence “anxiety-
interpretation-response” (Hinshel-wood 1994, 
38). The child plays and produces symbolic 
material for interpretation; the analyst 
presents an interpretation as soon as the 
child shows, by an evident surge in anxiety, 
that a dangerous phantasy is close to 
consciousness; the child responds to this 
interpretation in words or further play; the 
analyst interprets this response; and so on, in 
a sequence that is only limited by the clock—
the end of the session. The sequence is 
taken up again the next day and the next—in 
Richard’s case for 93 sessions, but usually 
for even longer—as long as it takes for the 
child’s symptoms and distress (for instance, 
night terrors or fear of other children) to 
diminish. Klein’s clinical method has been de-
scribed as involving “continual interpretation...[a] 
constant working over and revaluation of data” 
(Segal and Meltzer 1963, 512)—a process of 
“sorting things out and throwing things away, 
and turning up new ideas,” a “serial approx-
imation” (Meltzer 1998, 167‒69) that proceeds 
in the dark. 
Let us turn to a few examples in 
Narrative of Klein’s method of “deep” interpret-
ation and Richard’s responses.  
In the third session, Richard begins 
talking about developments in the war:  
He soon turned to the map and expressed his 
fears about the British battleships being blockaded 
in the Mediterranean if Gibraltar were taken by the 
Germans. They could not get through Suez. He 
also spoke of injured soldiers and showed some 
anxiety about their fate. He wondered how the 
British troops could be rescued from Greece. What 
would Hitler do to the Greeks; would he enslave 
them? Looking at the map, he said with concern 
that Portugal was a very small country compared 
with big Germany, and would be overcome by 
Hitler.  
Mrs K. interpreted that he also worried 
unconsciously about what might happen to Daddy 
when he put his genital into Mummy. Daddy might 
not be able to get out of Mummy’s inside and 
would be caught there, like the ships in the 
Mediterranean…. [The following recalls material 
from the two earlier sessions.] He was also afraid 
that Mummy would be hurt by the tramp-
Daddy....His dog Bobby stood for himself wanting 
to take his father’s place with Mummy...and 
whenever he felt jealous and angry, he hated and 
attacked Daddy in his thoughts.... 
Richard smiled agreement at Mrs K.’s saying that 
the dog stood for himself, but disagreed 
emphatically with the other part of the 
interpretation, because he would never do such a 
thing (1961, 27‒28). 
As might be expected, the child 
defends himself stoutly against the analyst’s 
suggestion that he wants to attack his “tramp-
Daddy” and be a husband to his Mummy. 
From the analyst’s point of view, this 
  www.msvu.ca/atlantis ■□    35.2, 2011   35  
resistance springs from his guilt and anxiety 
about his own aggression, anxiety that will 
eventually be moderated and contained by 
further interpretations, leading to a better 
“adjustment outside the analysis” and an 
“improve[ed]...sense of reality” (Meltzer 1998, 
237‒38).  
Richard is described by Klein as a 
hypochondriac. In the fifth session, he 
sneezes and becomes anxious that he is 
getting sick with a cold. Klein records his 
words: “‘He knows his blows’, meaning to 
say, ‘He blows his nose’....” (1961, 34). 
Taking advantage of his amusement when 
she points out this “slip of the tongue,” Mrs K. 
interprets his anxiety over a cold as involving 
fear of “something bad inside him, hence the 
blows” (34). Richard’s response to this 
punning interpretation is to look upside-down 
at the map of Europe; he comments that the 
new, “funny” shape Europe has from this 
perspective is “‘not proper’...[it is] ‘muddled 
and mixed up’” (34). Mrs K. takes a leap: his 
real meaning is his parents “‘muddled and 
mixed up’ in sexual intercourse....This was 
what he meant by ‘not proper’, ‘funny’” 
(34‒35). Not surprisingly, Richard “show[s] 
anxiety” upon this interpretation and starts 
moving around the room, looking at things 
and talking about them. Then “Mrs K. 
interpret[s] that this exploring the room 
[stands] for the wish to explore her [Mrs K.’s] 
inside” (35)—that is, he is transferring to Mrs 
K. his desire to explore his mother’s inside. 
Richard’s response to this interpretation is to 
continue exploring the room, hence, for Mrs 
K., confirming her interpretation.  
André Green takes a critical view of 
this process of constant interpretation: “[A]n 
analysis conducted solely through interpret-
ations of the transference often puts the patient 
under unbearable pressure. The analysis 
takes on an aspect of persecution even if 
these interpretations are designed to help the 
patient understand what is happening within 
him” (Green 1997, 298‒99). We might also 
ask what effect such interpretations have on 
the reader, for instance, when Mrs K. tells 
Richard that he wishes to have sexual 
intercourse with her (and Mummy). Can the 
reader remain neutral? A Kleinian analyst 
reading the narrative might focus on Mrs K.’s 
technique and not be surprised at the content 
of her interpretations. Another reader might 
judge Mrs K. to be a “fool and fantast” (Rose) 
for interpreting the boy’s upset over re-
settlement and his war anxieties—at a time 
when Britain feared invasion by Germany—in 
these Oedipal terms. Another might be 
squeamish at some of her assertions or 
horrified by them: how can a therapist talk to 
her child patient about his wanting to have 
sex with her? (The margins of my own copy 
of the book are full of exclamation points and 
comments such as “Ugh!”) Reading Narrative 
can indeed seem an “intimate journey to the 
end of the night” (Kristeva 2001, 8), the 
reader swept up counter-transferentially in 
the murky dynamics of the analysis itself. Yet, 
if Mrs K. seems quite foolish or even mad at 
points, some might see her interpretive 
excesses as the beginning of insight. Kristeva 
argues, following in the tradition of the 
Romantics, Rimbaud, and Artaud, that 
“[m]adness must not be ignored or brushed 
aside, but spoken, written, and thought”; from 
her perspective as a psychoanalyst, she sees 
“madness...[as] quietly lurk[ing] inside 
us...encourag[ing] excesses and limitations - 
but also innovations” (2001, 8).  
Richard’s responses to Mrs K.’s 
interpretations take a number of forms. He 
denies the interpretation, or laughs. He gets 
up and walks around, turns the fire on and 
off, goes to the tap and drinks. Or he goes 
out into the garden: for instance, in response 
to an interpretation that turning the fire off 
means “stopping life [killing babies] inside 
Mummy and Mrs K.,” he protests “that he 
[cannot] listen to this and he [wants] to go 
outside” (1961, 291). (Here, however, he 
sees only weeds.) For Richard, sometimes no 
response is best, as when he is silent after an 
interpretation or, as Klein notes often, does 
not appear to be listening. He does not 
respond, for instance, after listening to Mrs 
K.’s interpretation of a dream in which he is at 
a law court before a judge and then kicks 
some “tumbled-down buildings” with “his 
enormous black shoe”: Mrs K. states that this 
dream is really indicating his guilty desire to 
attack his parents, “stealing Daddy’s genital 
and also taking Mummy’s breast” (232). A 
moment later, Richard points to one of his 
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drawings, demonstrating another mode of 
resistance that a child (or indeed an adult) 
can use: he can distract the analyst. But Mrs 
K. immediately interprets the distraction, so 
then the boy has to find another way to make 
her stop: he interrupts her. Breaking into her 
interpretation of his positive transference—
that Mrs K. has become a “good Mummy”—
he tells her he knows how much his mother 
pays her (233). This interruption recasts his 
relationship to Mrs K. as taking place in the 
context of a financial transaction between his 
real mother and Mrs K., her paid help. 
In addition to silence (no response or 
not listening), distraction, and interruption, 
there are other modes of resistance. For 
instance, Richard develops a sore throat, 
sniffles, and tummy ache, which are likely 
psychosomatic symptoms. At times he is 
given to bursts of aggressive acting-out (he 
stamps on plants in the garden, throws 
furniture around, shouts, and kicks); at times 
he defaces the text under interpretation (he 
scribbles over certain drawings). Verbal 
resistance can involve direct denial: when 
Richard puts a battleship representing his 
father alongside a cruiser representing 
himself, and Mrs K. interprets that the Daddy 
and Richard ships are “put[ting] their genitals 
together,” “Richard strongly object[s]...[saying] 
he could not have such desires, he would not 
like to do such things with his genital at all” 
(286). On another occasion he protests (per-
haps too much), “‘But I am an innocent child’” 
(269). When he does assent to an interpret-
ation, he may use flattery in order to keep 
ahead, telling Mrs K. that she is “very clever 
to find...out” that a snake in a drawing is 
actually an octopus, their agreed symbol for 
Daddy (248). Sometimes Richard tries to get 
ahead of his analyst, as when he asks her 
“appealingly, ‘What are your secrets?’” His 
question does not elicit Mrs K.’s secrets, of 
course; she tells him he is curious about what 
she and his parents “are doing at night” (272). 
At one point he questions her about psycho-
analysis itself: “It seemed such a secret to 
him. He would like to get to the ‘heart of it’” 
(231). He is told that the heart stands for his 
parents’ secrets and their genitals. 
Richard’s most effective mode of 
resistance to Mrs K.’s interpretations is to 
play along. If the analysis is a kind of play 
itself, tossing out colourful interpretations, if it 
is a game with Oedipal rules, then Richard 
(who is very bright) is soon interpreting the 
symbolic meanings of his own play. In doing 
so, he is anticipating Mrs K.’s interpretations. 
For instance, after arranging his toy battle-
ships into allies vs. enemies—hesitating over 
which side Mrs K. is on, as she speaks 
German—Richard points to the Germans and 
says, ‘“This is the bad Mummy with the bad 
children’” (270‒71). Again, when he touches 
the Mummy destroyer with the Richard 
destroyer, and Mrs K. tells him this means 
having intercourse with his mother, Richard 
points out that five smaller destroyers are his 
babies with Mummy (173). In another 
example, when Mrs K. tells him that a 
drawing portrays his genital inside hers, he 
points out four more of his genitals, more 
than his father and brother have (177). Thus, 
in making his own interpretations, Richard 
shifts the text of the analysis—which, 
however playful, is single-authored—and 
makes it one that he writes with her. His 
playing along is just as much a form of 
resistance as direct denial is; however, Klein 
seems to take his interpretations as 
confirming those of Mrs K.  
At points, interestingly, Richard over-
turns the rules of the game and insists that 
certain things are not symbolic. For instance, 
when he draws a little fish close to a bigger 
fish, Mrs K. suggests that the little fish is a 
“baby...feeding at its mother’s breast and that 
was one reason why he [is] jealous of it” 
(260). With the common sense of childhood, 
Richard tells her “that a fish has not got 
breasts, it has fins” (260). Sometimes a fish is 
just a fish.  
Of Mrs K.’s counter-transference 
during these analytic sessions, Klein does not 
say a great deal. In one session near the end, 
during which Richard is acting up destructively, 
Mrs K. “[becomes] impatient” with him, “which, 
being unusual, frighten[s] him very much” (419). 
In his week-by-week discussion of the case, 
Meltzer refers to “the urgency of the counter-
transference situation, related to the short-
ness of time,” as the end of the analysis is 
always in sight (1998, 229). Given that the 
end is approaching, sometimes the boy 
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needs reassurance, and it would seem the 
analyst’s neutrality might shift a bit. In fact, 
Klein does acknowledge that she “had given 
a very direct reassurance which [she] on the 
whole deprecate[s].…My knowledge that he 
might not, for years to come, have any 
opportunity for analysis...no doubt had an 
influence on my counter-transference” (1961, 
325‒26). However, the counter-transference 
appears to be, on the whole, a mistake for 
correction, and Mrs K. is presented as being 
emotionally rather neutral. This de-emphasis 
of the analyst’s responses accords with Klein’s 
de-emphasis of the counter-transference in her 
writings on practice. While she includes notes 
commenting on each session, she addresses 
mostly the theoretical implications of her 
findings. Further, Klein’s use of the persona 
“Mrs K.” instead of “I” in recounting the 
sessions would appear to be a way of 
neutralizing the counter-transference. 
Klein wrote Narrative of a Child 
Analysis on the basis of notes she had made 
after each session with Richard. Like any 
case narrative, Klein’s Narrative reconstructs 
the analytic sessions, arranging, adding, and 
deleting. Such a process of reconstruction is 
particularly emphasized in a case narrative, 
like Klein’s, written some years after the 
sessions providing its material. She emphasizes 
her later perspective by including comments 
on the implications of each session. For 
instance, in a note added to the end of the 
session in which Richard informs Mrs K. that 
“a fish has not got breasts,” Klein is evidently 
still interpreting his remark: “In retrospect I am 
struck by the fact that Richard, who usually 
followed quite closely my interpretations of 
his symbolic presentation of material, at this 
point stated that a fish has no breasts. I 
would now conclude that this was because 
his envy of the breast led him to deny that his 
mother ever had breasts” (262). 
At the time she was writing Narrative, 
Klein was developing her theory of envy, 
specifically the idea of the infant’s envy of the 
breast and desire to spoil it; in 1957 she 
published the essay “Envy and Gratitude” 
(1997b). In the above passage, she interprets 
Richard’s resistance as based on envy not 
only of his mother’s breast, but also, through 
the transference, of his analyst’s good milk—
her nourishing interpretations. In observing 
that the boy “usually followed quite closely my 
interpretations,” Klein would seem to be 
countering the acts of resistance that she 
records, her comment indicating what Bass 
refers to as “the countertransference fantasy 
of controlling the patient” (Bass 2000, 233). 
She comments on one session, for instance, 
when Richard is being very negative—saying 
he did not want to come today, scribbling 
over his drawings, and shouting (Klein 1961, 
260)—that he “had to some extent been 
listening”; it “was difficult to know what he had 
heard or taken in. But he quietened down 
somewhat” (1961, 260). In another such 
comment, Richard “[does] not disagree” with 
an interpretation focusing on the genitals of the 
“octopus-daddy” in a drawing (138). Does this 
mean he agrees? Such comments, emphasizing 
Richard’s usual compliance or evading the 
possibility of his non-compliance, suggest a 
counter-resistance on Klein’s part, evidently 
still operative years after the analysis. As she 
was working on the narrative in old age (she 
died in 1960), she may have been attempting 
to lay the case to rest for the last time.  
Thus, a boy of ten can be for his 
analyst an ongoing source of preoccupation; 
his remembered acts of resistance provoke 
her continuing interpretations and drive for 
knowledge and control. Working through and 
reinterpreting the sessions twenty years later, 
Klein demonstrates that Richard’s analysis 
was incomplete: it could have gone on much 
longer. She acknowledges that due to the war 
situation, “adequate working-through was not 
possible” (1961, 13). Yet it is not only war or 
other external factors that prevent “adequate 
working-through.” It is in the nature of analysis 
itself to be potentially interminable: as Hugh 
Haughton puts it, there is a “double commit-
ment to interpretation and resistance to inter-
pretation” (Freud 2003, ix), a commitment to 
cure and a fascination with that which resists 
cure. Both resistance and counter-resistance 
are inevitable in analysis, and “neutrality is 
never a once-and-for-all achievement” (Bass 
2000, 271). Such factors complicate a reading 
of analysis as solely enforcing norms and 
judging difference as disorder.  
Case narratives such as Klein’s show 
analysis to involve the drive to interpret another 
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person to the depths so as to bring about a 
normalizing cure. Yet these narratives also 
record a process of poetic-symbolic play, a 
mutual communication from “unconscious to 
unconscious” (Bollas 2007, 87), which, pro-
ceeding in intuitive, associative leaps, shifts 
the ground of interpretation and authority 
from moment to moment. Klein saw the hours 
of play analysis as filled with “colour, life, and 
complexity” (1932, 34). While I do not think 
that psychoanalysis in its focus on the un-
conscious “erases the boundary between the 
‘normal’ and the ‘pathological,’” as Kristeva 
asserts (2001, 8), its practice does complicate 
this boundary and the associated dichotomy 
of order and disorder. In Klein’s case, I agree 
with Deborah Britzman’s paradoxical assess-
ment that “what Klein’s change signified was 
a radical reconsideration of normality and 
knowledge through the making of psycho-
analytic knowledge” (Britzman 2003, 58). Klein’s 
Narrative shows that in analysis—and in reading 
analysis—the meaning of disorder could not 
be more ambiguous. 
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